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PosTAL PowER-ExcLUSION OF PERIODICAL PUBLICATION FROM SECOND-CLASS MAILING PRIVILEGE-THE EsQUIRE CASE-Respondent is the
publisher of the well-known monthly periodical Esquire. In l 933 it was granted
a second-class mailing permit pursuant to section 14 of the Classification Act
of 1879.1 In 1943 the then Postmaster General, Frank C. Walker, issued a
citation to respondent to show cause why the permit should not be suspended
or revoked, on the theory that the magazine did not qualify under the fourth
condition of the act, relevant portions of which read as follows: "It must be
originated and published for the dissemination of information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and
having a legitimate list of subscribers." 2 Congress has declared obscene matter
to be non-mailabl.e,3 but the. Postmaster General did not base his action on
obscenity. He claimed rather that Esquire's" writings and pictures wer.e "in that
obscure and treacherous borderland zone where the average person hesitates to
find them technically obscene, but still may see ample proof that they are morally
improper and not for the public welfare and the public good.'n A hearing was
held before a board designated by the Postmaster General,5 which after hearing
forty-eight witnesses over a period of seventeen days found that Esquire did not
violate the Fourth Condition, •and therefore recommended that the magazine
retain its second-class privilege.6 The Postmaster General, however, revoked

1 20 Stat. L. 355 at 359, 43 Stat. L. 1053 at 1067 (1925), 39 U.S.C. (1940)
'§221. This section allows second class rates to "periodical publications."
2 20 Stat. L. 359 (1879), 39 U.S.C. (1940) §226. The othel'._ three conditions
of admission to the second class are as follows: "First. It must regularly be issued at

stated intervals, as frequently as four times a year, and bear a date of issue, and be
numbered consecutively. Second. It must be issued from a known office of publication.
Third. It must be formed of printed paper sheets, without board, cloth, leather, or
other substantial binding, such as distinguish printed books for preservation from periodical publication.•••" No claim was made by the Postmaster General that Esquire
failed to comply with the first three conditions.
3 35 Stat. L. u29 (19~9), 18 U.S.C. (1940) §334.
4 Principal case at 458.
.
11 31 Stat. L. uo7 (1901), 39 U.S.C. (1940) §232. "When any publication has
been accorded second-class mail privileges, the same shall not be suspended or annulled
until a hearing shall' have been granted to the parties interested." Procedure and con~
ditions of such hearings are set forth in 7 FED. REG. 3001 (1942).
6 Record of hearing, p. 1838.
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the permit.7 Respondent sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia
to enjoin enforcement of the revocation order, the parties stipulating that the
suit would not be defended on the ground that Esquire was obscene or otherwise unmailable. The district court denied the injunction.8 The circuit court
of appeals reversed.9 On certiorari, held, affirmed. The Postmaster General
exceeded his powers in revoking the second-class mailing privilege of a mailable
periodical because in his opinion it failed to make a positive contnoution to the
public welfare. Hannegan, Postmaster General 'lJ. Esquire, Inc., (U.S. 1946)
66 S.Ct. 456.10
The first important statement by the Supreme Court of the United States
concerning the control of Congress over the postal service was found in Ex parte
J ackson, 11 where the Court held constitutional a statute 12 which declared information concerning lotteries to be non-mailable, and made violation of its
terms punishable by fine. In that case petitioner contended that since Congress
had forbidden any private person to carry the mail,18 it had imposed on itself
the duty of doing so; that although Congressional power over the mail admittedly extended to such measures as would expedite or protect the working of
the service, such power did not extend to denying the mail to "established mail
matter." u The Court, in an opinion which stood for two generations as the
basis of judicial thought on the subject, said, first, "The power vested in Congress 'to establish post-offic;es and post-roads' has been practically construed,
since the foundation of the government, to authorize not merely the designation
of the routes over which the mail shall be carried, and the offices where letters
and other documents shall be received to be distnouted or forwarded, but the
carriage of the mail, and all measures necessary to secure its safe and speedy
transit, and the prompt delivery of its contents," 15 and then added, "The power
possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the
country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the
right to determine what shall be excluded." 16 The Court recognized two limita7 The Postmaster General's order concerning hearings provides, inter alifl, "Upon
the basis of the transcript, the briefs, the exhibits and the hearing officer's report, the
Postmaster General ••• shall issue an order either .•• revoking the second-class mailing
privileges ••• or dismissing the proceeding." 7 FED. REG. 3001 at 3003 (April 23,
1942).
8
(D.C. D.C. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 1015. This case is discussed in a note, 53
YALE L. J. 733 (1944).
9
(App. D.C. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 49 (1945). For a history of the case up to this
point see Professor John B. Waite's comment in 43 M1cH. L. REv. u72 (1945).
10
The history of congressional restriction on the use of the mails is presented
by Eberhard P. Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and of the Mails," 36 M1cH. L. REV.
703 (1938); for more recent summary, relying heavily on Deutsch, see 28 VA. L.
REV. 634 (1942).
11
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
12
U.S. Rev. Stat. (1878)" §3894, as amended by act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat.
L. 90.
18
U.S. Rev. Stat. (1878) §3982.
u 96 U.S. 727 at 730 (1877).
15
Id. at 732.
10
Id. at 732.
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tions on the regulatory power of Congress: freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure of sealed mail, and freedom of the press. 17 In connection with the
latter, the Court adds, "Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as
liberty of publishing; indeed, )Vithout the circulation, the publication would be
of little value," and concludes, "If, therefore, printed matter be excluded from
the mails, its transportation in any other' way cannot be forbidden by Congress." 18 As to the statute in question, the Court said, "In excluding various
articles from the mail, the object 19 of Congress has not been to interfere with
the freedom, of the press, or with any other rights of the people; but to refuse
its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public
morals." 20 Regarding the procedure to be observed, the Court added, "And as
to objectionable printed matter, which is open to examination, the regulations
may be enforced • . . in some cases, by the direct action of the officers of the
postal service. In many instances, these officers can act upon their own inspection." 21 This case has b.een set out thu$ fully, as it is felt to be significant that
th~ power of Congress to exclude from the mails has so long rested on a theory
of almost unlimited proprietary control. In re Rapier,22 decided in 1892 on a
similar question, followed Ex parte Jac.kson, 23 adding, "The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent
in the cir:culation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people." 2 '
The case of Public Clearing House v. Coyne, decided in 1904,25 represents
a culmination and summary of the views express.ed in the J ac.kson and Rapier
cases, that the power of Congress over the postal system is unlimited except by
the reasonable search and seizure doctrine and by the first amendment, and this
latter qualified by the idea that forbidding the use of the mails was not deprivation of circulation since other avenues of circulation remained open. This case
arose under a statute 26 of the United States providing that the Postmaster General, on evidence satisfactory to himself that any person or company was engaged
in conducting a lottery or scheme fo obtain money by false or fraudulent pretenses, might return to the transmitting post office all mail addressed to such
person or company, with the word "Fraudulent" stamped on the outside.27
The Court repeated the statements of the Jac.kson and Rapier cases, but made
17ld. at 733.
18 Id.-at 733. The reasoning here is hard to follow. Since circulation is as impor~
tant to freedom of the press as publication, and the mail is the only significant mode
of circulation, this restriction on Congress appears illusory and would give an aggrieved
publisher cold comfort.
19 "Congress shall make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press•••." Constitution of United States, 1st Amendment. (Italics supplied.)
20
96 U.S. 727 at 736 (1877). (Italics supplied.)
21
Id. at 736.
22
143 U.S. IIO, 12 S.Ct. 374 (1892).
28
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
2
.i 143 U.S. IIO at 134 (1892).
25
194 U.S._497, 24 S.Ct. 780 (1904).
26
U.S. Rev. Stat. (1878) §3929, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890,
26 S~at. L. 465, and by the act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. L. 963.
27
194 U.S. 497 at 505 (1904).
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the basic proposition even more sweeping: "The postal service is by no means an
indispensable adjunct to a civil government •.• but is a public function, assumed
and established by Congress for the general welfare. . • • The legislative body
in thus establishing a postal service may annex such conditions to it as it
chooses." 28 The vi.ew of Congressional power thus expressed was followed
explicitly for a generation after the Public Clearing House case. 29 By way of
contrast the principal case indicates that there may be substantive limits to the
power of Congress to control the postal system. Speaking for a unap.imous
Court, Justice Douglas, though admitting that Congress may constitutionally
declare obscene or fraudulent matter non-mailable,30 and that it has power to
classify various types of mailable matter,81 adds, "But grave constitutional questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege
which may be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever 82 • • • • The
validity of the obsc.enity laws is recognition that the mails may not be used to
satisfy all tastes, no matter how perverted. But Congress has left the Postmaster
General with no power to prescribe standards for the literature or the art which
a mailable periodical disseminates." 88 That the postal power of Congress is
subject also to procedural limitations is indicated by another recent case, Walker,
Postmaster General v. Popenoe,84 decided in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Here the Postmaster General had without a hearing barred
from the mails as obscene a pamphlet published by appellant Popenoe, entitled
Preparing for Marriage. In reversing the district court's refusal to enjoin the
Postmaster's order, the court of appeals based its decision on two independent
grounds: that the publication was not obscene as a matter of fact, and that even
if it were, an order barring a publication from the mails without a hearing is a
violation of due process.85 Judge Arnold, speaking for the court, makes the
point that the mails represent the only effective means of circulation, and adds,
"In making the determination whether any publication is obscene the Postmaster
General necessarily passes on a question involving the fundamental liberty of a
28

Id. at ·506.
Notably, in Warren v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 183 F. 718; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 36 S.Ct. 367 (1916), in which Holmes, J.,
speaking for a unanimous court, said, "The overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United States is a matter that Congress may regulate•••• Whatever the
limits to its power, it may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that
it regards as contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not."
Id. at 393. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 42 S.Ct. 227 (1922), upholding a fraud
order of the Postmaster General over a strong dissent of Holmes, J., on the grounds
that the order was contrary to the First Amendment; and Electric Bond and Share Co.
v. S.E.C., 303 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 678 (1938), upholding the power of Congress to
deny the use of the mails in order to enforce "a valid regulation pertinent to the use
of the mails." Id. at 442.
ao Principal case at 461.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
33
Id. :it 462.
H (App. D. C. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511.
85
Id. at 513.
29
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citizen. This is a judicial and not an executive function. It must be exercised
according to the ideas implicit in the Fifth Amendment 36 • • • • A full hearing
is the minimum protection required by due process.•••" 87
John R. Dykema

86

81

lbid.
Id. at 514.

